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Abstract. We extend the definition of a convex risk measure to a conditional
framework where additional information is available. We characterize these risk
measures through the associated acceptance sets and prove a representation
result in terms of conditional expectations. As an example we consider the class
of conditional entropic risk measures. A new regularity property of conditional
risk measures is defined and discussed. Finally we introduce the concept of
a dynamic convex risk measure as a family of successive conditional convex
risk measures and characterize those satisfying some natural time consistency
properties.
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1 Introduction
In recent years a growing attention has been devoted to an axiomatic treatment
of the quantification of financial risks. Artzner et al. proposed in their seminal
work [1] a set of desirable axioms that every risk measure should satisfy, defining
in such a way the class of coherent risk measures. Delbaen [4] proved that, under
a mild continuity assumption, every coherent risk measure can be represented as
worst expected loss with respect to a given set of probabilistic models. Fo¨llmer
and Schied [8] and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin [9] introduced independently
the more general class of convex risk measures weakening the axioms of positive
homogeneity and subadditivity by replacing them with convexity. They also ex-
tended Delbaen’s representation result allowing for the occurrence of a penalty
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function defined on a set of probabilistic models. A common feature of all these
approaches is the static temporal setting, i.e. the risk measures do not accommo-
date for intermediate payoffs or additional information. These two issues have
been addressed simultaneously in T.Wang [15], Riedel [11] and Weber [16]. We
concentrate on the information aspect and investigate on a general probability
space conditional risk measures.
This paper aims at giving a possible axiomatic foundation to the risk assess-
ment of final payoffs when additional information is available. This is the case,
for example, when the riskiness of a payoff occurring at time T is quantified
at an intermediate date t ∈ (0, T ). We define conditional convex risk measures
as maps, satisfying some natural axioms, which associate to every payoff, rep-
resented by a random variable X, its riskiness ρ(X) which is itself a random
variable, depending on the available information. Furthermore, under a mild
technical assumption, we give a characterization of these maps as worst condi-
tional expected loss with respect to a given set of probabilistic models, maybe
corrected by some random penalty function. A new regularity property is in-
troduced and several equivalent formulations are presented; this property, which
is economically plain, states that ρ(X) should not depend on that part of the
future which is ruled out by the additional information. As an example for con-
ditional convex risk measures, the class of entropic risk measures, as defined in
[7], is generalized to the conditional setting. These risk measures are first defined
as capital requirements with respect to an utility-based acceptability criterion.
Then their penalty functions are identified as the conditional relative entropy
between the considered probabilistic models and a reference model. The last
part of the paper is devoted to a study of dynamic convex risk measures, i.e.
families of conditional convex risk measures, describing the risk assessment of a
final payoff at successive dates. We introduce two economically motivated prop-
erties of time consistency that relate different components of a dynamic convex
risk measure. Finally, we provide some characterizations of these properties in
terms of the family of penalty functions of their components.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define conditional convex
risk measures by generalizing the translation invariance and convexity axioms.
We also provide a characterization of these risk measures as conditional capital
requirements with respect to suitable acceptance sets. In Section 3 we show
that, under a continuity assumption, every conditional convex risk measure can
be represented as worst conditional expected loss with a random penalty func-
tion defined on a set of probabilistic models. Section 4 contains a discussion of
a regularity property which is shared by every conditional convex risk measure.
In Section 6 the class of conditional entropic risk measures is introduced as an
example for conditional convex risk measures. Section 6 is devoted to dynamic
convex risk measures and contains a discussion of natural time consistency prop-
erties. Finally, the Appendix collects definitions and some useful results about
extended valued random variables and essential suprema.
2
2 Conditional convex risk measures
We denote with L0, resp. L∞, the space of random variables, resp. bounded
random variables, defined on some fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ). A good
feature of these spaces is their invariance with respect to the probability measure,
provided it is chosen in the equivalence class of P . Let G ⊆ F be a sub-σ-algebra
and define the two subspaces
L0G , {X ∈ L0 | X is G-measurable},
L∞G , L∞ ∩ L0G .
Finally, we define the following two sets of probability measures:
P , {Q probability measure on (Ω,F) | Q P on F}
PG , {Q ∈ P | Q ≡ P on G}.
The probability measures in P can be interpreted as probabilistic models. An
element X ∈ L∞ describes a random net payoff to be delivered to an agent at
a fixed future date. The σ-algebra G collects the information available to the
agent who is assessing the riskiness of the payoff X. As a consequence the risk
measurement of X leads to a random variable ρ(X) which is measurable with
respect to G, i.e. an element of the space L0G . We are thus studying maps of the
type ρ : L∞ → L0G , to be called conditional risk measures. Plainly, we interpret
ρ(X)(ω) as the degree of riskiness of X when the state ω prevails.
Remark 2.1 The σ-algebra G can be interpreted in different ways. It can model
additional information available at date t = 0 to the agent. Alternatively, it can
be interpreted as information available at a future date t > 0, resulting from the
observation of some variables related to the payoff X in the time interval [0, t].
In both cases, the sources of information can be public, i.e. shared by all agents,
or private. Hence, conditional risk measures open a way to the analysis of the
consequences of asymmetric information for risk measurement. ♦
Consider the following three properties to be shared by a conditional risk
measure ρ:
• (Conditional) Translation Invariance For any X ∈ L∞ and Z ∈ L∞G :
ρ(X + Z) = ρ(X)− Z
• Monotonicity. For any X,Y ∈ L∞:
X ≤ Y ⇒ ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y )
• (Conditional) Convexity. For any X,Y ∈ L∞ and Λ ∈ L∞G with 0 ≤
Λ ≤ 1:
ρ(ΛX + (1− Λ)Y ) ≤ Λρ(X) + (1− Λ)ρ(Y ).
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Definition 2.2 A map ρ : L∞ → L∞G is called a conditional convex risk measure
if it is translation invariant, monotone, convex and satisfies ρ(0) = 0.
If we have no initial information, i.e. G is the trivial σ-algebra, then the definition
of a conditional convex risk measure coincides with the unconditional one.
Remark 2.3 Some economic considerations to be discussed in Section 4 suggest
to assume that ρ(0) is a constant random variable. The choice ρ(0) = 0 has no
particular economic relevance, but it allows mathematical simplification as it
implies ρ(α) = −α for every α ∈ R. However, from the mathematical viewpoint,
the assumption ρ(0) ∈ L∞G is sufficient to ensure the validity of the following
results. ♦
Remark 2.4 We do not loose any generality by assuming that the values of
a conditional convex risk measure are bounded. Indeed, if X ∈ L∞, then
−||X||∞ ≤ X ≤ ||X||∞, so that
−∞ < −||X||∞ = ρ(||X||∞) ≤ ρ(X) ≤ ρ(−||X||∞) = ||X||∞ < +∞
and as a consequence ρ(X) ∈ L∞G . ♦
The economic rationale behind the properties characterizing conditional convex
risk measures is the same as in the unconditional case (see [1], [8], [9]). In
particular, translation invariance provides the interpretation of a convex risk
measure ρ as (conditional) capital requirement. Indeed, it is easy to show that
the conditional risk measure ρ is translation invariant if and only if
ρ(X) = ess.inf {Y ∈ L∞G | X + Y ∈ Aρ}, (1)
where
Aρ , {X ∈ L∞G | ρ(X) ≤ 0}
is called the acceptance set of ρ. The following proposition states some important
relations between conditional risk measures and acceptance sets. We refer to the
Appendix for the definition and some properties of the essential infimum.
Proposition 2.5 If ρ is a conditional convex risk measure, then its acceptance
set Aρ is:
a. conditionally convex, i.e. ΛAρ + (1 − Λ)Aρ ⊆ Aρ for every Λ ∈ L∞G with
0 ≤ Λ ≤ 1,
b. solid, i.e. X ≥ Y ∈ Aρ ⇒ X ∈ Aρ,
c. such that ess.inf Aρ = 0 and 0 ∈ Aρ.
Conversely, if a set A ⊂ L∞ satisfies the previous properties, then the map
ρA(X) , ess.inf {Y ∈ L∞G | X + Y ∈ A}, X ∈ L∞,
is a conditional convex risk measure.
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Proof. The properties of acceptance sets follow directly from the definition
of conditional risk measures. Concerning the second claim, it is straightforward
to verify that ρA satisfies translation invariance, monotonicity and the normal-
ization property ρA(0) = 0; it follows in particular that ρA takes values in L∞G .
We show that ρA is conditionally convex. Suppose that X,Y ∈ L∞ and that
ZX , ZY ∈ L∞G are such that ZX+X ∈ A and ZY +Y ∈ A. For Λ ∈ L∞G with 0 ≤
Λ ≤ 1, the conditional convexity of A implies Λ(ZX+X)+(1−Λ)(ZY +Y ) ∈ A.
Hence, by the translation invariance of ρA,
0 ≥ ρA(Λ(ZX +X) + (1− Λ)(ZY + Y ))
= ρA(ΛX + (1− Λ)X)− (ΛZX + (1− Λ)ZY )
and the conditional convexity of ρA follows. 
3 A robust representation result
In the unconditional case, we remind that every convex risk measure ρ : L∞ → R
which is continuous in a mild sense, admits the representation:
ρ(X) = sup
Q∈P
{−EQX − α(Q)}, X ∈ L∞, (2)
in terms of a so called penalty function α : P → [0,+∞]; see [6] or [9] for a proof.
We prove below that a similar characterization holds as well for conditional con-
vex risk measures which are continuous in a sense to be specified. In this more
general representation formula, the expectations are conditional on the available
information G, the penalty function is random-valued and the supremum is un-
derstood in the essential sense. Moreover, in the conditional case the additional
information allows to exclude a-priori some probabilistic models. In fact, we
show that only the models in PG ⊆ P may enter the representation. This fact
can be interpreted in economic terms as caution: the smaller the information
G, the larger is the subset PG of probabilistic models which can be considered
in the worst case representation. For ease of presentation we give the following
definition where L0G(R+) , {X ∈ L0(R) | X is G-measurable, X ≥ 0} (see the
Appendix).
Definition 3.1 A map ρ : L∞ → L∞G is said to be representable if
ρ(X) = ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | G)− α(Q)}, X ∈ L∞ (3)
for a map α : PG → L0G(R+). In this case, α is called a (random) penalty function
for ρ.
It is immediate to check that any representable map with a penalty function α
satisfying
ess.inf
Q∈PG
α(Q) = 0
5
is a conditional convex risk measure. Under a mild continuity condition the
converse holds as well as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 3.2 Let ρ : L∞ → L∞G be a conditional convex risk measure. Then
the following are equivalent:
a. ρ is continuous from above, i.e. Xn ↘ X P -a.s. implies ρ(Xn) ↗ ρ(X)
P -a.s.;
b. ρ is representable;
c. ρ is representable in terms of
α∗(Q) , ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(X | G)− ρ(X)}, Q ∈ PG .
Proof. c =⇒ b This implication follows immediately.
b =⇒ a. Suppose that ρ is representable with a penalty function α and that
Xn ↘ X P -a.s. By monotone convergence we have that
−EQ(Xn | G)− α(Q)↗ −EQ(X | G)− α(Q)
for every Q ∈ PG . Hence, the robust representation yields
ρ(X) = ess.sup
Q∈PG
{ lim
n→∞[−EQ(Xn | G)− α(Q)]}
≤ lim inf
n→∞ ess.supQ∈PG
{−EQ(Xn | G)− α(Q)}
= lim inf
n→∞ ρ(Xn).
On the other hand, the monotonicity of ρ implies lim infn→∞ ρ(Xn) ≤ ρ(X).
a =⇒ c. The inequality
ρ(X) ≥ ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q)}
easily follows from the definition of α∗. Indeed, for every Q ∈ PG and X ∈ L∞
it holds ρ(X) ≥ −EQ(X | G)−α∗(Q) and thus the inequality is recovered taking
the supremum over all Q ∈ PG .
Hence, in order to prove the representability of ρ it suffices to show that
EP [ρ(X)] ≤ EP [ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q)}].
To this end, consider the map ρ0 : L∞ → R defined by ρ0(X) , EP [ρ(X)], X ∈
L∞. It is simple to check that ρ0 is a (unconditional) convex risk measure;
furthermore, if Xn ↘ X P -a.s., then ρ(Xn) ↗ ρ(X) P -a.s. and, by monotone
convergence
ρ0(Xn) = EP [ρ(Xn)]↗ EP [ρ(X)] = ρ0(X),
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so that ρ0 is continuous from above. Hence, Theorem 4.26 in [8] implies that ρ0
has the following representation:
ρ0(X) = sup
Q∈P
{−EQX − α∗0(Q)},
where
α∗0(Q) , sup
X∈L∞
{−EQX − ρ0(X)}.
We now prove that if α∗0(Q) < +∞, then Q ∈ PG . To this end, note that if X ∈
L∞G , then by translation invariance of ρ we have ρ0(X) = EP [ρ(X)] = −EPX.
Suppose now that Q(A) 6= P (A) for some A ∈ G, then
α∗0(Q) ≥ sup
λ∈R
{−EQ(λIA)− ρ0(λIA)}
= sup
λ∈R
{−λQ(A) + λP (A)} = +∞.
Since EQX = EQ[EQ(X | G)] = EP [EQ(X | G)] for every Q ∈ PG , it follows
that
ρ0(X) = sup
Q∈PG
{−EP [EQ(X | G)]− α∗0(Q)}.
Next we prove that EP [α∗(Q)] = α∗0(Q) for every Q ∈ PG . We claim that for
every Q ∈ PG the set BQ , {−EQ(X | G)− ρ(X) | X ∈ L∞} is upward directed
(see the Appendix). In fact, if X,Y ∈ L∞ we can define Z , XIA+Y IAc ∈ L∞,
where A , {−EQ(X | G)−ρ(X) ≥ −EQ(Y | G)−ρ(Y )} ∈ G. Since both IA and
IAc are G-measurable, 0 ≤ IA ≤ 1 and IAc = 1 − IA, the conditional convexity
of ρ yields:
ρ(Z) = ρ(XIA + Y IAc) ≤ IAρ(X) + IAcρ(Y ).
As a consequence
−EQ(Z |G)− ρ(Z) =
=− EQ(XIA + Y IAc | G)− ρ(XIA + Y IAc)
≥[−EQ(X | G)− ρ(X)]IA + [−EQ(Y | G)− ρ(Y )]IAc
≥max(−EQ(X | G)− ρ(X),−EQ(Y | G)− ρ(Y )),
thanks to the definition of A, and therefore BQ is upward directed.
Then it follows by Lemma A.2, for any Q ∈ PG ,
EP [α∗(Q)] = EP [ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(X | G)− ρ(X)}]
= sup
X∈L∞
{−EPEQ(X | G)− EP [ρ(X)]}
= sup
X∈L∞
{−EQX − ρ0(X)} = α∗0(Q).
Hence, we get
EP [ρ(X)] = ρ0(X) = sup
Q∈PG
{−EP [EQ(X | G)]− EP [α∗(Q)]}
≤ EP [ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q)}],
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and the proof is complete. 
Remark 3.3 Analogue to the unconditional case, the penalty function α∗ in the
preceding theorem is the minimal penalty function which may enter a robust
representation for ρ, i.e. α∗ ≤ α for all penalty functions α for ρ. The following
useful equality holds
α∗(Q) = ess.sup
X∈Aρ
{−EQ(X | G)}, Q ∈ PG ,
as in the unconditional case. ♦
The following lemma will be useful in Section 6.
Lemma 3.4 If α∗ is the minimal penalty function of a representable conditional
risk measure ρ and H ⊆ G is a sub-σ-algebra, then
EP (ρ(X) | H) = ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | H)− EP (α∗(Q) | H)}, X ∈ L∞.
Proof. First we prove that the set
CX , {−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q) | Q ∈ PG}
is upward directed. Indeed, for any Q′, Q′′ ∈ PG define the probability measure
Q on F by
Q(B) , Q′(A ∩B) +Q′′(Ac ∩B), B ∈ F ,
where
A , {−EQ′(X | G)− α∗(Q′) ≥ −EQ′′(X | G)− α∗(Q′′)} ∈ G.
It is immediate to observe that Q ∈ PG and that EQ(X | G) = IAEQ′(X |
G) + IAcEQ′′(X | G) for any X ∈ L∞. By applying Lemma A.3 we obtain
α∗(Q) = ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(XIA | G)− IAρ(X)}+ ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(XIAc | G)− IAcρ(X)}
= ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−IAEQ′(X | G)− IAρ(X)}+ ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−IAcEQ′′(X | G)− IAcρ(X)}
= IAα∗(Q′) + IAcα∗(Q′′).
As a consequence
−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q) =
= IA(−EQ′(X | G)− α∗(Q′)) + IAc(−EQ′′(X | G)− α∗(Q′′))
≥ max(−EQ′(X | G)− α∗(Q′),−EQ′′(X | G)− α∗(Q′′)),
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by definition of A. Hence, the set CX is upward directed.
Then Lemma A.2 in its conditional form yields
EP (ρ(X) | H) = ess.sup
Q∈PG
{EP (−EQ(X | G)− α∗(Q) | H)}
= ess.sup
Q∈PG
{−EQ(X | H)− EP (α∗(Q) | H)},
as we desired. 
Remark 3.5 Note that the restriction to PG in the choice of the probabilistic
models gives sense to expressions like ess.sup {−EQ(X | G) | Q ∈ Q}. Indeed,
if Q ∈ PG , then L0G(P ) = L0G(Q); therefore EQ(X | G) ∈ L0G(P ) for every Q
and the supremum is well-defined. In the proof of the previous theorem, we also
made use of the natural equality EP [EQ(X | G)] = EPX, which holds if and
only if Q ∈ PG . Moreover, it is important to observe that if Q and P are not
even equivalent on G, then it may happen that EQ(X | G) /∈ L0(P ) and in that
case the expectation of X with respect to P is meaningless. ♦
Remark 3.6 A conditional coherent risk measure can be defined as a condi-
tional convex risk measure that is positively homogeneous, i.e. ρ(ΛX) = Λρ(X)
for any X ∈ L∞ and any Λ ∈ L∞G with Λ ≥ 0. As in the unconditional case,
it can easily be shown that the minimal penalty function of a representable
conditional coherent risk measure ρ vanishes on the convex set
Q∗ , {Q ∈ PG | EQ(X | G) ≥ −ρ(X) ∀X ∈ L∞}
and takes otherwise the value +∞. Therefore it can be represented as
ρ(X) = ess.sup
Q∗∈Q
{−EQ(X | G)}.
Conversely, any map with such a representation is a conditional coherent risk
measure. ♦
Example 3.7 For a parameter Λ ∈ L∞G with 0 < Λ < 1 we consider the set of
probabilistic models
QΛ , {Q ∈ PG | dQ
dP
≤ Λ−1}.
The corresponding conditional coherent risk measure
AVaRΛ(X) , ess.sup
Q∈QΛ
{−EQ(X | G)}, X ∈ L∞
is called Average Value at Risk at level Λ. It generalizes the unconditional risk
measure AVaRλ (see e.g. Definition 4.36 in [8]). ♦
For an example of a conditional convex risk measure which is not coherent we
refer to the entropic risk measures to be introduced in Section 5.
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4 A regularity property
In a sense, the additional information available to the agent has to be fully used
when assessing the riskiness of a payoff X. This means, in particular, that if we
know that an event A ∈ G is prevailing, then the riskiness of X should depend
only on what is really possible to happen, i.e. on the restriction of X to A. This
simple requirement is captured by the following property.
Definition 4.1 A conditional risk measure ρ : L∞ → L∞G is said to be regular
if for every A ∈ G and X,Y ∈ L∞
XIA = Y IA =⇒ ρ(X)IA = ρ(Y )IA
Some equivalent definitions of regularity are stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.2 The following are equivalent for a conditional risk measure ρ:
a. ρ is regular;
b. ρ(XIA) = ρ(X)IA for every A ∈ G and X ∈ L∞;
c. ρ(XIA + Y IAc) = ρ(X)IA + ρ(Y )IAc for every A ∈ G and X,Y ∈ L∞;
d. ρ(
∑N
n=1XnIAn) =
∑N
n=1 ρ(Xn)IAn for pairwise disjoint An ∈ G, Xn ∈ L∞
and N ≥ 1.
Proof. a. =⇒ b. Since XIA = (XIA)IA and 0IAc = (XIA)IAc , by regularity
we have ρ(X)IA = ρ(XIA)IA and 0 = ρ(0)IAc = ρ(XIA)IAc . Summing up we
obtain
ρ(XIA) = ρ(XIA)IA + ρ(XIA)IAc = ρ(X)IA.
b. =⇒ c. We have
ρ(XIA + Y IAc) = ρ(XIA + Y IAc)IA + ρ(XIA + Y IAc)IAc
= ρ((XIA + Y IAc)IA) + ρ((XIA + Y IAc)IAc)
= ρ(XIA) + ρ(Y IAc)
= ρ(X)IA + ρ(Y )IAc .
c. =⇒ d. The proof is an induction on N . When N = 1 just take Y = 0 in
c. Suppose for induction that c. holds for every index less or equal to N . If
(An)N+1n=1 is a family of pairwise disjoint events in G, define B , ∪Nn=1An ∈ G.
Using c. we obtain
ρ(
N+1∑
n=1
XnIAn) = ρ(
N∑
n=1
XnIAnIB +XN+1IAN+1IBc)
= ρ(
N∑
n=1
XnIAn)IB + ρ(XN+1IAN+1)IBc
=
N∑
n=1
ρ(Xn)IAn + ρ(XN+1)IAN+1 .
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d. =⇒ a. From d. follows b. directly. If XIA = Y IA then b. implies
ρ(X)IA = ρ(XIA) = ρ(Y IA) = ρ(Y )IA and therefore ρ is regular. 
In the unconditional case, regularity holds trivially for any map ρ : L∞ →
L∞G = R. When G is not trivial, then this is not true in general. For example,
the simple map ρ(X) , EPX, X ∈ L∞ is not regular if G is not trivial.
Proposition 4.3 Every conditional convex risk measure is regular.
Proof. From the conditional convexity of Aρ follows directly
IAAρ + IAcAρ = Aρ (4)
for all A ∈ G.
Then for X,Y ∈ L∞ and A ∈ G, we have
ρ(IAX + IAcY ) = ess.inf {Z ∈ L∞G | IAX + IAcY + Z ∈ Aρ}
= ess.inf
{
L∞G ∩ (Aρ − IAX − IAcY )
}
= ess.inf
{
L∞G ∩ (IA(Aρ −X) + IAc(Aρ − Y ))
}
,
where the third equality follows from (4). It is immediate to see that if A,A′ ⊆
L∞ and A ∈ G, then L∞G ∩ (IAA+IAcA′) = IA(L∞G ∩A)+IAc(L∞G ∩A′). Hence,
we obtain
ρ(IAX + IAcY ) = ess.inf
{
IA(L∞G ∩ (Aρ −X)) + IAc(L∞G ∩ (Aρ − Y ))
}
= IA ess.inf
{
L∞G ∩ (Aρ −X)
}
+ IAc ess.inf
{
L∞G ∩ (Aρ − Y )
}
= IAρ(X) + IAcρ(Y ),
where we applied Lemma A.3 in the second equality. We conclude by applying
Proposition 4.2. 
Remark 4.4 Regularity of a conditional risk measure implies in particular the
following natural property: if a final payoff X is constant on an event A ∈ G,
that is XIA = γIA P -a.s. for a constant γ ∈ R, then ρ(X) should be constant
as well on that event. Indeed, if XIA = γIA P -a.s. for γ ∈ R and A ∈ G, then
according to Proposition 4.2 regularity implies:
ρ(X)IA = ρ(XIA) = ρ(γIA) = ρ(γ)IA = −γIA,
so that ρ is constant on A as well. ♦
5 The class of conditional entropic risk measures
In the unconditional case, the notion of entropic risk measure has been intro-
duced in [8] (see example 4.60). In the definition of this class of risk measures, it
11
is assumed that an agent has an exponential utility uγ(x) = 1− exp(−γx), with
γ > 0 as risk aversion coefficient. His acceptance set is then naturally defined to
be
Aγ , {X ∈ L∞ | EPuγ(X) ≥ EPuγ(0) = 0},
which is solid and convex; the resulting convex risk measure ργ(X) , inf{m ∈
R | X + m ∈ Aγ} is called the entropic risk measure associated with the risk
aversion γ. It has been proved (see [8]) that the risk measure ργ is continuous
from above and that its minimal penalty function in the robust representation
is
α∗0(Q) ,
1
γ
H(Q|P ),
where
H(Q|P ) , EP
(
dQ
dP
log
dQ
dP
)
is the relative entropy of Q with respect to P .
Remark 5.1 If we replace in the previous construction the exponential utility
with another, increasing and concave but otherwise general, utility u we obtain
the larger class of utility-based convex risk measures. An interesting issue is
the comparison between the initial preference structure, X  Y ⇔ EPu(X) ≥
EPu(Y ), and the derived one, X ′ Y ⇔ ρu(X) ≤ ρu(Y ), where ρu is the risk
measure induced by u. In [10] the entropic risk measures have been characterized
as the only ones - apart from those induced by linear utilities - for which  and
′ coincide. ♦
We now pass to the conditional case in which a sub-σ-algebra G ⊆ F is fixed.
We assume, as before, that the agent is characterized by the exponential utility
uγ(x) = 1− exp(−γx) for a risk aversion γ > 0. The (random) expected utility
of the agent conditional on the information G is therefore
Uγ(X) , EP (1− e−γX | G) = 1− EP (e−γX | G) ∈ L0G .
Consider, as in the unconditional case, the acceptance set
Aγ , {X ∈ L∞ | Uγ(X) ≥ Uγ(0) = 0} = {X ∈ L∞ | EP (e−γX | G) ≤ 1}.
It satisfies the conditions in Proposition 2.5 and thus leads to a conditional
convex risk measure ργ that has the explicit representation
ργ(X) , ess.inf {Y ∈ L∞G | X + Y ∈ Aγ}
= ess.inf {Y ∈ L∞G | EP (e−γX | G) ≤ eγY }
=
1
γ
logEP (e−γX | G).
Definition 5.2 The conditional convex risk measure ργ defined above is called
the conditional entropic risk measure associated with the risk aversion γ > 0.
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The name entropic derives, as in the unconditional case, from the form of the
penalty function in the robust representation. Therefore, we extend the notion
of relative entropy to the conditional setting.
Definition 5.3 For every Q ∈ PG the conditional relative entropy of Q w.r.t.
P is
HG(Q|P ) , EP
(
dQ
dP
log
dQ
dP
| G
)
.
For Q ∈ PG , we have the representation
HG(Q|P ) =
EP
(
dQ
dP log
dQ
dP | G
)
EP (dQdP | G)
= EQ
(
log
dQ
dP
| G
)
,
because EP (dQdP | G) = 1 is the density of Q w.r.t. P on G. Interpreting Q
and P as regular conditional probabilities the conditional relative entropy can
also be introduced pointwise as (unconditional) relative entropy. This approach
coincides with definition 5.3 for Q ∈ PG .
With this notion of conditional relative entropy, we can represent the minimal
penalty function of entropic risk measures.
Proposition 5.4 For any γ > 0, ργ is representable and its minimal penalty
function is
α∗(Q) =
1
γ
HG(Q|P ), Q ∈ PG
Proof. Using monotone convergence it is straightforward to prove continuity
from above. According to Theorem 3.2, ργ is thus representable. The form of
the minimal penalty function can be derived as
α∗(Q) = ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(X | G)− ργ(X)}
= ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(X | G)− 1
γ
logEP (e−γX | G)}
=
1
γ
ess.sup
Z∈L∞
{EQ(Z | G)− logEP (eZ | G)}, Q ∈ PG .
Finally, Lemma 5.5 proves the claimed representation of the minimal penalty
function. 
Lemma 5.5 For any Q ∈ PG it holds
ess.sup
Z∈L∞
{EQ(Z | G)− logEP (eZ | G)} = HG(Q | P ).
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Proof. ”≤”. For any fixed Z ∈ L∞, the random variable
ϕZ , e
Z
EP (eZ | G)
is strictly positive, integrable and EPϕZ = 1, so that it is the density w.r.t. P
of a probability measure PZ ∼ P . Hence, we have Q PZ and
Z − logEP (eZ | G) = log dP
Z
dP
= log
dQ
dP
− log dQ
dPZ
which yields
EQ(Z | G)− logEP (eZ | G) = EQ(log dQ
dP
| G)− EQ(log dQ
dPZ
| G)
Because of PZ ∈ PG applying Jensen’s inequality to the convex function g
defined by g(x) = x log x for x > 0 and g(0) = 0 yields
EQ(log
dQ
dPZ
| G) = EPZ (g(
dQ
dPZ
) | G) ≥ g(EPZ (
dQ
dPZ
| G)) = g(1) = 0.
We then conclude
EQ(Z | G)− logEP (eZ | G) = HG(Q | P )− EQ(log dQ
dPZ
| G) ≤ HG(Q | P ).
”≥”. Set ϕ , dQ/dP and define the sequence of bounded random variables
Zn , (−n) ∨ logϕ ∧ n.
By considering the conditional expectation EP (eZn | G) separately on the sets
{ϕ ≥ 1} and {ϕ < 1} we find that
EP (eZn | G)→ EP (elogϕ | G) = 1.
Moreover, Fatou’s lemma yields
lim inf
n→∞ EQ(Zn | G) = lim infn→∞ EP (ϕZn | G) ≥ EP (ϕ logϕ | G) = HG(Q | P ).
It then follows
ess.sup
Z∈L∞
{EQ(Z | G)− logEP (eZ | G)} ≥
≥ lim inf
n→∞ {EQ(Zn | G)− logEP (e
Zn | G)}
= lim inf
n→∞ {EQ(Zn | G)} ≥
≥ HG(Q | P ).

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Remark 5.6 It is possible to consider random risk aversion coefficients Γ ∈ L∞G ,
Γ > 0 and random utility functions uΓ(x, ω) = 1 − exp(−Γ(ω)x). This gener-
alization could be employed to model the preferences of an agent whose utility
is exponential, but whose risk aversion depends on the additional information
G. It is straightforward to see that Proposition 5.4 holds true also in this case
under the assumption Γ−1 ∈ L∞G . ♦
6 Dynamic convex risk measures
In this section we investigate conditional risk measures in a dynamic framework
where successive measurements are performed. Consider a finite set of dates
0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tN = T when the riskiness of a final payoff at time T is
assessed. We introduce a filtration (Fn)Nn=0 where Fn models the information
available at time tn. Moreover, we assume that F0 is trivial and FT = F .
Definition 6.1 A dynamic convex risk measure is a family (ρn)Nn=0 where every
ρn : L∞ → L∞n , L∞(Fn) is a conditional convex risk measure.
Remark 6.2 The risk measurement at time tN = T has been introduced for
ease of notation only. Note that the only conditional convex risk measure at
time tN is ρN (X) = −X for all X.
The concept of a dynamic risk measure has first been introduced by T.Wang
[15] and then elaborated on by Riedel [11] and Weber [16]. Consistently with
our previous discussion, we additionally require that every component is a con-
ditional convex risk measure. Plainly, a dynamic convex risk measure maps a
random variable X ∈ L∞ into the adapted process (ρn(X))Nn=0 and can be seen
as the result of a risk assessment of a final payoff through time.
This definition of a dynamic convex risk measure is quite general: in fact it can
be completed by some form of internal time consistency. Consider the following
three properties for a dynamic convex risk measure (ρn)Nn=0:
• Time consistency. For any X,Y ∈ L∞ and 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 it holds
ρn+1(X) = ρn+1(Y ) =⇒ ρn(X) = ρn(Y )
• Recursiveness. For any X ∈ L∞ and 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 it holds
ρn(X) = ρn(−ρn+1(X)).
• Supermartingale. For any X ∈ L∞ and 0 ≤ n ≤ N − 1 it holds
ρn(X) ≥ EP (ρn+1(X) | Fn).
The financial meaning of time consistency is based on a general intuition: if two
payoffs will have tomorrow the same riskiness in every state of nature, then the
same conclusion should be drawn today as well. The case for recursiveness, on
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the contrary, strongly relies on the interpretation of a conditional convex risk
measure as a capital requirement. In fact, it requires that the riskiness ρn(X) of
a final payoff X today equals the riskiness of the capital requirement ρn+1(X)
that has to be set aside tomorrow. The property of recursiveness has been
introduced by Roorda et al. [12] and Riedel [11] and it is actually equivalent to
time consistency. Indeed, assume that (ρn)Nn=0 is time consistent and fix n; by
conditional translation invariance of ρn+1 we have ρn+1(−ρn+1(X)) = ρn+1(X),
so that ρn(−ρn+1(X)) = ρn(X). The converse implication is trivial.
Finally, the supermartingale property can be interpreted as follows: as time
evolves, the information about the payoff X increases. This should lower the
perceived riskiness - not almost surely, but in the (conditional) mean.
Remark 6.3 Arztner et al. [2] show in a two period example (see the remark
after Definition 5.5) that the dynamic convex risk measure whose general com-
ponent is a conditional Average Value at Risk with a fixed parameter is not time
consistent. ♦
An example for a dynamic convex risk measure that shares all the three above
mentioned properties is given by the dynamic entropic risk measure whose gen-
eral components are
ρn(X) ,
1
γ
logEP (e−γX | Fn), X ∈ L∞
with risk aversion γ > 0.
Proposition 6.4 Every dynamic entropic risk measure is time consistent and
satisfies the supermartingale property.
Proof. For any n and X ∈ L∞ we have
ρn(X) =
1
γ
logEP (e−γX | Fn)
=
1
γ
logEP (exp{−γ(− 1
γ
logEP (e−X | Fn+1))} | Fn)
= ρn(−ρn+1(X)).
The process (ρn(X))Nn=0 is a P -supermartingale since it is a concave function of
the P -martingale (EP (e−γX | Fn))Nn=0. 
We now assume that a dynamic convex risk measure (ρn)Nn=0 is representable,
meaning that every component is representable. In this case, for every n it holds
ρn(X) = ess.sup
Q∈Pn
{−EQ(X | Fn)− α∗n(Q)}, X ∈ L∞
where Pn , {Q ∈ P | Q ≡ P on Fn} and
α∗n(Q) , ess.sup
X∈L∞
{−EQ(X | Fn)− ρn(X)}, Q ∈ Pn.
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Plainly, Pn+1 ⊂ Pn for all n and PN = {P}. Our aim is now to relate the
dynamic properties of the family (ρn)Nn=0 to some properties of the family of
minimal penalty functions (α∗n)
N
n=0. We begin with a sufficient condition for the
supermartingale property.
Proposition 6.5 If EP (α∗n(Q) | Fn−1) ≥ α∗n−1(Q) for any Q ∈ Pn, then
(ρn(X))Nn=0 is a P -supermartingale for any X ∈ L∞.
Proof. We have
EP (ρn(X) | Fn−1) = ess.sup
Q∈Pn
{−EQ(X | Fn−1)− EP (α∗n(Q) | Fn−1)}
≤ ess.sup
Q∈Pn−1
{−EQ(X | Fn−1)− α∗n−1(Q)} = ρn−1(X),
where Lemma 3.4 has been applied in the first equality. 
From now on, we assume that for any probability measure P on F and
any sub-σ-algebra G ⊆ F , a regular conditional probability of P given G exists.
Remind that a regular conditional probability of P given G is a map PG : Ω×F →
[0, 1] such that PG(ω, ·) is a probability measure for each ω and PG(., A) is a
version of EP (IA|G) for every A ∈ F . This assumption is satisfied if (Ω,F) is
a Polish measurable space or, more generally, if F is countably generated (see
[5] for other sufficient conditions). In what follows, Pn will denote the regular
conditional probability of P given Fn.
Definition 6.6 If Q  P and G ⊆ F is a sub-σ-algebra, then the past-
ing of P and Q in G is the probability measure PQG defined by PQG(A) ,
EP (QG(·, A)), A ∈ F .
It is not difficult to prove that
EPQG (X|H) = EP [EQ(X|G)|H]
for every sub-σ-algebra H ⊆ G.
Proposition 6.7 The family (ρn)Nn=0 is time consistent if and only if for every
n the map
αn(Q) , EQ(α∗n+1(PQn+1)|Fn) + ess.inf {α∗n(R) | R ≡ Q on Fn+1}, Q ∈ Pn
is a penalty function for ρn.
Proof. For every X ∈ L∞ Lemma 3.4 yields
ρn(− ρn+1(X)) =
= ess.sup
R∈Pn
{ER(ess.sup
S∈Pn+1
{−ES(X | Fn+1)− α∗n+1(S)} | Fn)− α∗n(R)}
= ess.sup
R∈Pn, S∈Pn+1
{−ER(ES(X | Fn+1) | Fn)− α∗n(R)− ER(α∗n+1(S) | Fn)}
= ess.sup
R∈Pn, S∈Pn+1
{−ERSn+1(X | Fn)− βn(R,S)},
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where βn(R,S) , α∗n(R) + ER(α∗n+1(S) | Fn).
Note that {RSn+1 | R ∈ Pn, S ∈ Pn+1} = Pn. The inclusion ”⊆” is easy to
see. For the converse, observe that a probability measure Q ∈ Pn can be written
in the form Q = RSn+1 if and only if Q ≡ R on Fn+1 and Qn+1 ≡ Sn+1 (P -
a.s. as probability measures): these conditions are met by taking R = Q and
S = PQn+1. Hence
ρn(−ρn+1(X)) = ess.sup
Q∈Pn
{−EQ(X | Fn)− αn(Q)},
where
αn(Q) , ess.inf {βn(R,S) | R ∈ Pn, S ∈ Pn+1, Q = RSn+1}
= ess.inf {α∗n(R) + ER(α∗n+1(S) | Fn) | R ≡ Q on Fn+1,
S ∈ Pn+1, Sn+1 ≡ Qn+1}
= ess.inf {α∗n(R) + ER(α∗n+1(PQn+1) | Fn) | R ≡ Q on Fn+1}.
Finally, observe that if R ≡ Q on Fn+1, then ER(Y |Fn) = EQ(Y |Fn) for any
Y ∈ L0n+1 for which the expectations exist; consequently
αn(Q) = EQ(α∗n+1(PQn+1) | Fn) + ess.inf {α∗n(R) | R ≡ Q on Fn+1}.
We easily conclude, observing that ρn(−ρn+1(X)) = ρn(X) if and only if αn
defined above is a penalty function for ρn. 
A dynamic coherent risk measure is defined to be a dynamic convex risk
measure whose components are coherent. If it is representable, then for every n
we have
ρn(X) = ess.sup
Q∈Q∗n
{−EQ(X | Fn)},
where Q∗n , {Q ∈ Pn | EQ(X | Fn) ≥ −ρn(X)∀X ∈ L∞} is the set where
α∗n vanishes. Therefore Proposition 6.5 and Proposition 6.7 can be stated in a
simpler way.
Corollary 6.8 Let (ρn)Nn=0 be a representable dynamic coherent risk measure.
1. It satisfies the supermartingale property provided Q∗n ⊆ Q∗n−1 for any n.
2. It is time consistent if and only if for any n, ρn can be represented in terms
of
Qn , {Q ∈ Pn | PQn+1 ∈ Q∗n+1 and ∃Q′ ∈ Q∗n s.t. Q′ ≡ Q on Fn+1 }.
Conclusions
We characterize the class of conditional risk measures which can be interpreted
as good conditional capital requirements. In particular, under a weak techni-
cal assumption which is essentially the same as in the unconditional setting,
18
we provide a representation for these risk measures as worst conditional loss
with respect to a set of probabilistic models and a penalty function. The main
difference in comparison with the unconditional setting is provided by the ran-
dom nature of these two objects. This is natural, since they describe, in some
sense, the degree of trustworthiness towards different models, which depends on
available information and thus may change in time. In the representation we
propose, additional information is reflected both in the conditional nature of the
expectations and in the penalty function. This issue is particularly important
when successive risk measurements of the same payoff are performed or, in our
terminology, when a dynamic risk measure has to be constructed. In this case,
a penalty process has to be chosen, describing how the degree of trustworthiness
of different models evolves through time. In the last section it is shown how this
choice is constrained by some basic natural consistency properties. Notwith-
standing, in our opinion the class of penalty processes is still too large from an
economic viewpoint, so that other consistency properties have to be discussed
even in connection with the theory of updating information. Finally, a complete
economic interpretation of the penalty term still lacks, even in the classical set-
ting. This interpretation could be related to some sort of preference structure
in the dual space, that of probabilistic models. We leave this important issue to
further investigation.
A Appendix
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space and denote by L0(R) the space of extended
random variables, i.e. P -equivalence classes of F-measurable maps from Ω to
R , [−∞,+∞], where the natural extension of the Borel σ-algebra is considered
on R. The preorder initially defined on L0 naturally extends to this larger space;
we refer to Section II.4 in [14] for other natural conventions. For any subset
X ⊆ L0(R), the family of dominating random variables D(X ) , {Z ∈ L0(R) |
Z ≥ X, ∀X ∈ X} is not empty, since it contains +∞.
Theorem A.1 For any X ⊆ L0(R) there exists a unique element X∗ ∈ D(X )
such that X∗ ≤ Z for any Z ∈ D(X ). If in addition X is upward directed, i.e.
for any X1, X2 ∈ X there exists X ∈ X such that X ≥ max(X1, X2), then there
is an increasing sequence (Xn)n∈N in X such that Xn ↗ X∗ P -a.s.
Proof. See [8], Theorem A.18 
The random variable X∗ characterized in the previous theorem is called the
essential supremum of X and denoted by ess.supX . The essential infimum is
defined by ess.inf X , −ess.sup (−X ).
The definition of (conditional) expectation is naturally extended to L0(R): see
again [14] for details.
Lemma A.2 If X ⊆ L0(R) is upward directed then it holds
EP (ess.supX ) = sup
X∈X
EPX,
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provided the expectations exist.
Proof. ”≥” This relation follows from ess.supX ≥ X for all X ∈ X .
”≤” According to Theorem A.1 there is a sequence (Xn)n∈N in X such that
Xn ↗ ess.supX . Then
EP (ess.supX ) = EP ( lim
n→∞Xn) = limn→∞EP (Xn) ≤ supX∈X EP (X),
thanks to the monotone convergence theorem. 
The previous result holds as well if expectations are replaced by conditional
expectations with respect to some sub-σ-algebra G ⊆ F and in the right hand
side the essential supremum is considered.
Lemma A.3 If X ,Y ⊆ L0(R) and A ∈ F , then
ess.sup (X IA + YIAc) = (ess.supX )IA + (ess.supY)IAc ,
where X IA + YIAc , {XIA + Y IAc | X ∈ X , Y ∈ Y}.
Proof. ”≤” This relation is immediate.
”≥” If Z ∈ D(X IA + YIAc) then consider Z ′ , ZIA + (ess.supX )IAc . Since
Z ′ ≥ X for all X ∈ X , then Z ′ ≥ ess.supX . Hence, we have ZIA = Z ′IA ≥
(ess.supX )IA and the claim follows from a similar argument on Ac. 
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